Introduction
While much has been said about the increasing involvement of the USSR in Southern Africa, little has been said about how and why the USSR wishes to achieve its aims in the sub-continent. Little has really changed since 1917, when Lenin himself declared bluntly that the scientific concept of dictatorship means neither more nor less than unlimited power, resting directly on force, not limited by anything, nor restricted by any laws, nor any absolute rules. Nothing else but that.
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The increasing interest of the USSR in Southern Africa, the arms build-up in neighbouring countries, the better cadre of Soviet diplomats sent to the area: all this should be seen in the context that Soviet aims are essentially unchanged since 1917, and that the Kremlin wishes to establish dictatorships in Southern Africa. The Soviet policy in Southern Africa rests directly on force, and that it is bound by no absolute rules, should surprise nobody but the na'lve. That Soviet policy in the sub-continent has some apparent contradictions should also come as no surprise: bearing in mind that it is 'not limited by anything, nor restricted by any laws'.3
Capitalist motives for communist activity
The heightened Soviet interest in Southern Africa can be accounted for in economic terms: a driving force behind Soviet activity may also be a need to secure raw materials. 4 The twentieth century is now witnessing a repetition of the 'scramble for Africa' that took place in the nineteenth century. Now, however, it is not powers such as France, Germany, Great Britain, and Belgium that are involved but the USSR. Afghanistan and also Poland has been fear; a fear of what would happen to the rest of the Soviet empire if one country were allowed to defect from it; a fear of what the rest of the Soviet empire would demand if one country were allowed more political freedom, more economic freedom, a higher standard of living 9 As Brezhnev said to Dubeek shortly before the invasion of Czechoslovakia: 'Don't talk to me about socialism. What we (Russians) have we hold, '10 While Soviet expansion can be seen as a systematic drive for world domination, it can also be seen as an inefficient system that can only survive by continued expansion. There are historical parallels. In the 19th century, Great Britain, France, Germany and other nations spent large amounts of their gross national products on defence. The burden of this defence spending was not felt in those countries, largely because the armies of those countries were put to very good use: in gaining new colonies. The raw materials obtained from these colonies meant another source of cheap imports (cheap because the power in control of the colony arranged the exports to suit itself, not the colony concerned), more factories and industries could be built to use the new cheap materials, and thus more economic growth resulted. 11
In short, a vicious circle developed: bigger armies meant more colonies could be obtained, the economy grew, more could be spent on defence, still bigger armies and fleets resulted.
The growth of the Imperial powers of Europe and Russia was only ended by the First World Wara war caused by zones of influence expanding and becoming zones of competion for influence. 12 Source: L.B. Russet, writing in International Affairs, Vol. 58, NO.1, While an economy is on a war footing, the effects of high defence spending are not noticeable; if more colonies are being gained. But if the high level of defence spending is not put to 'good use', economic stagnation results. This may be seen in a comparison between the Great Britain of the nineteenth century, enjoying industrial growth and economic prosperity for much of that period; and the same country in the grim days of World War Two, a Great Britain where defence spending rose to 60% national product, a country with a war economy, with shortages and rationing everywhere in evidence.
14 There is a country where defence spending consumes much of the gross national product,15 a country with a war economy, a country beset by shortages and economic stagnation: the USSR. Not only the USSR is in a state of deepening economic stagnation, but also the nations the USSR has conquered.
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The strategy of denial
The strategy of denial involves a denial of resources to the West, i.e. the aim is to place the USSR so as to be able to effectively threaten the movement of important resources to the West. This could take the form of interfering with shipping rounding the Cape carrying oil vital to Western economies. But such a strategy would also provide an explanation for Soviet interest in the Middle East, and Southern Africa: if the Kremlin were to obtain control of Middle Eastern oil, and the African countries producing strategic minerals such as chromite ore, cobalt and uranium, the USSR would be able to manipulate the Western economies virtually at will -in exchange for these vital raw materials. For example, nearly half of the uranium used by British nuclear reactions comes from the Rossing uranium mine in South-West Africa. The same mine provides about 17% of the non-commissioned world's uranium.
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The strategy of denial is usually seen in terms of Marxist-Leninist theory: Soviet activity in Africa and elsewhere is one more step on the long road towards world domination.
The strategy of gain
Here Soviet activity is viewed from an economic viewpoint: it is easier for the communists to obtain what they need from Africa than to exploit their own resources. In other words, the communist economic system is so hopelessly inefficient at exploiting the vast natural resources of the USSR and its satellites that it is far easier for the Soviet satellite nations to exploit the economies of Angola, Mozambique and other African nations than to import what they need for communist countries that are far nearer home. 
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forces are used to effectively provide economic 'colonies' which can be exploited by East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and Yugoslavia. The presence of technicians, teachers and skilled personnel from these countries in many Southern African nations is surely no coincidence.
An example of the strategy of gain being applied would be as follows. Firstly, terrorist attacks would escalate into a prolonged guerrilla war: as is happening in EI Salvador today. This guerrilla war would then further escalate into a civil war: viz, the Lebanon. From the ensuing chaos, a new government would be formed, a government formed from ex-terrorists. This is now the case in Nicaragua and many African countries. The new government would not be forced to adopt economic policies suitable to the Kremlin: economic aid would be offered from the Soviet bloc, and the terms of this aid would include recommendations that mines and industries of interest to the communist bloc arrive to run the nationalised industries and mines as part of that aid. The output of these industries and mines can now be exported to either the USSR, or Eastern Europe: at very much cheaper prices than would normally be obtained. The country concerned is now under the virtual economic control of the Kremlin.
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Conclusion
A general description of the Soviet threat to Southern Africa has been given. Two aspects of this, the strategy of gain and the strategy of denial, have been expounded.
However, it should never be forgotten that communist strategy is immutable: it is not changed by changing governments, by detente, or negotiations. When peace negotiations are being undertaken, it is essential to understand the Soviet view of peace: to impose communism is to attain peace, and true peace can only be attained when all the world is communist.
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To the Soviets, peace is a means of obtaining the goals of war by non-violent methods, peace is just another opportunity to regroup and improve the strategic position of the communist movement. 
